Η παραίτηση Draghi και η μεγάλη εικόνα: η πολιτική αστάθεια θα δοκιμάσει την Ευρώπη

21 Ιουλίου 2022

Κρίσιμα κράτη-μέλη της ΕΕ εισέρχονται σε φάση πολιτικής αστάθειας. Η σχετική αποδυνάμωση του Μακρόν, η παραίτηση Ντράγκι στην Ιταλία και η χιονοστιβάδα προβλημάτων για την κυβερνητική συμμαχία στο Βερολίνο αποτελούν σημάδια υποχώρησης της αρχικά πολύ συνεκτικής ευρωπαϊκής προσέγγισης στα προβλήματα που έφεραν η πανδημία και, από τις 24 Φεβρουαρίου, η ρωσική εισβολή στην Ουκρανία.

Όμως η πολιτική αστάθεια είναι η κορυφή του παγόβουνου. Είναι πάντοτε εύκολο να αποδίδεται η αστάθεια στις περίφημες δυνάμεις του αριστερού ή δεξιού λαϊκισμού. Όμως τα προβλήματα και τα κενά στη διαχείρισή τους συνιστούν βαθύτερα αίτια. Αναλογιστείτε την ενεργειακή κρίση. Τα κομμάτια του παζλ είναι πολλά: η βιαστική απόπειρα ενεργειακής μετάβασης, ο δύσκολος στόχος της ενεργειακής ασφάλειας, η υιοθέτηση από το Κρεμλίνο μιας πολιτικής  αυξομειώσεων (και όχι διακοπής, όπως προέβλεπε η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή) στην παροχή φυσικού αερίου, οι διαφορές ανάμεσα στις ΗΠΑ (όπου τα όποια προβλήματα δεν σχετίζονται με τον ρωσο-ουκρανικό πόλεμο, αντίθετα η ενεργειακή θέση τους ενισχύεται) και την Ευρώπη (όπου η ρωσική παροχή δεν μπορεί να αντικατασταθεί άμεσα και φθηνά, γι’ αυτό και αναπτύσσονται δύσκολα σενάρια δραστικής εξοικονόμησης ενέργειας) και όλα αυτά ενώ η Ρωσία αναζητά – μέχρι στιγμής επιτυχώς – εναλλακτικούς πελάτες. Η Κίνα και η Ινδία έχουν αυξήσει τις εισαγωγές αργού πετρελαίου από τη Ρωσία, συμβάλλοντας στην αντιστάθμιση των απωλειών από τις ακυρώσεις της Δύσης.     

Οι μεγάλες ασυμμετρίες στην εξάρτηση των μελών της ΕΕ από τις ρωσικές ενεργειακές πηγές προκαλούν ζητήματα. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή επιχειρεί να βρει λύσεις με οριζόντιες μειώσεις στην κατανάλωση και με επίκληση μέτρων αλληλοβοήθειας στο πλαίσιο της «ενεργειακής αλληλεγγύης» που προωθείται με διαδικασία ειδικής πλειοψηφίας. Όπως ήταν αναμενόμενο, χώρες όπως η Ελλάδα, η Ισπανία και η Πορτογαλία εκφράζουν ήδη επιφυλάξεις για την προτεινόμενη μείωση κατά 15% από όλους της κατανάλωσης φυσικού αερίου.

Οι προκλήσεις δεν τελειώνουν εκεί. Η επανεμφάνιση μιας εκδοχής στασιμοπληθωρισμού επιβεβαιώνεται αλλά με σημαντικές αποκλίσεις μεταξύ κρατών της ΕΕ. Ενώ υπάρχουν πολλά υποβόσκοντα προβλήματα με δυνητικά εκρηκτικές κοινωνικές διαστάσεις. Π.χ. ακόμη και στη Γερμανία, η νέα κυβερνητική συμμαχία χρειάστηκε να επεξεργαστεί εξειδικευμένο σχέδιο για την αντιμετώπιση της στεγαστικής κρίσης σε πόλεις όπως το Βερολίνο. Σε λιγότερο εύρωστα κράτη μέλη, η στεγαστική κρίση θα αποτελέσει ακόμη δραματικότερη πρόκληση. 

Στο επίπεδο της κυβερνητικής πολιτικής, η κρίση στην Ιταλία είναι δυνητικά η περισσότερο επιζήμια για τη σημερινή ισορροπία στην ΕΕ. Ο Ντράγκι αποτέλεσε σημαντικό παράγοντα ενίσχυσης της συνεκτικής ευρωπαϊκής προσέγγισης. Η πτώση της κυβέρνησης Ντράγκι και οι νέες εκλογές θα ανοίξουν το δρόμο σε πολιτικές δυνάμεις με αμφίσημες τάσεις αναφορικά με την αντιμετώπιση του Κρεμλίνου.

Στην Γαλλία, η κυβέρνηση μειοψηφίας θα αντέξει μέχρι την πρώτη μεγάλη αντιπαράθεση. Τυχόν νέες βουλευτικές εκλογές το φθινόπωρο θα οδηγήσουν την γεωπολιτικά ισχυρότερη χώρα της ΕΕ σε σχετική εσωστρέφεια. Στο μεταξύ, η παρούσα εθνοσυνέλευση θα κληθεί να εγκρίνει και το σχέδιο πλήρους κρατικοποίησης του ενεργειακού κολοσσού Electricite de France. Με κύριο στόχο την ενίσχυση της ενεργειακής ασφάλειας της χώρας, το Παρίσι προωθεί μια στιβαρή πολιτική που όμως θα πρέπει να περάσει από μια εθνοσυνέλευση στην οποία η συμμαχία που στηρίζει τον Μακρόν δεν διαθέτει πια την πλειοψηφία.

Το πλαίσιο δίνει σήμερα ο συνεχιζόμενος ρωσο-ουκρανικός πόλεμος που εξελίσσεται μέσα από στάδια που προσφέρουν διαφορετικές ευκαιρίες και προβλήματα σε διαφορετικούς τρίτους δρώντες. Σε γενικές γραμμές: όσο συντηρείται η πολεμική φάση, προκύπτει μια προσωρινή ανάσχεση της εκδήλωσης της ευρωπαϊκής στρατηγικής αυτονομίας. Όμως το κόστος της βίαιης διπολοποίησης του πλανήτη είναι τεράστιο: αφενός ενισχύεται ο κίνδυνος περαιτέρω κλιμάκωσης του πολέμου, αφετέρου οι ευρωπαϊκές κοινωνίες εκτίθενται σε πιέσεις που σταδιακά θα οδηγήσουν σε απρόβλεπτες πολιτικές, περιφερειακές και διεθνείς συνέπειες.     

Οι μορφές έμμεσης δημοκρατίας με τις οποίες λειτουργούμε έχουν προβλήματα αλλά δεν παύουν να συνιστούν την μοναδική δυνατότητα που υφίσταται σήμερα για αποτελεσματική διακυβέρνηση με παράλληλη υπεράσπιση των φιλελεύθερων αξιών και των ατομικών δικαιωμάτων. Το ίδιο, τηρουμένων των αναλογιών, ισχύει σήμερα για την ΕΕ. Με όλα τα προβλήματά του, το ενωσιακό εγχείρημα είναι ταυτόχρονα πείραμα αλλά και μονόδρομος εάν εξακολουθούμε να επιθυμούμε μια Ευρώπη ειρήνης και δημοκρατίας. Οφείλουμε να επεξεργαστούμε το ιστορικό αυτό πείραμα περαιτέρω και με υπευθυνότητα, προτού η δεύτερη διάσταση χαθεί από την ματιά των πολιτών της.

* Ο Κώστας Α. Λάβδας είναι Καθηγητής στο Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο και έχει διατελέσει, μεταξύ άλλων, Senior Research Fellow στο London School of Economics και κάτοχος της Έδρας Ελληνικών και Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών «Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής» στο Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy του Πανεπιστημίου Tufts στις ΗΠΑ.

No, WWIII has not started – yet

History is complex and multi-layered – always has been. But recent facts in Ukraine are clear: the war started when Russian troops invaded Ukraine, shortly after Putin’s televised speech had announced a “special military operation”.

Almost a month later, the Russian military is trying to cut off Ukraine from the Sea of Azof and from the Black Sea as well. A major change of borders is clearly among the Kremlin’s goals. It was also clear from the start of the war that Putin’s goals included establishing a “neutral” Ukraine and changing the government in Kiev. The latter may or may not have been abandoned as a goal by now. 

With the understandable aim of increasing pressure on the West to get more actively involved in assisting Ukraine, officials in Kiev keep repeating that WWIII has practically begun. Surprisingly, some analysts seem to reluctantly concur. But this is an obvious fallacy which may, however, become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We need de-escalation, not rhetoric.

A war of aggression like the one Russia unleashed on Ukraine requires a serious response. Severe international sanctions are needed to underline the severity of breach suffered by international norms of acceptable state conduct. Sanctions are an instrument, a means toward a set of goals. In this case, what are the goals? What is the time frame? And what about the appropriate measures, alongside sanctions, to help make a negotiated peace more likely as an outcome?  

Every day people get killed, a massive exodus is under way from Ukraine, whole areas become deserted, and while all this takes place in front of our eyes, some pundits confuse sanctions with punishment.

In fact, first and foremost, sanctions are not supposed to complicate the end of conflict. Yet they can do just that by (a) offering an over-optimistic vision to the weaker part which is also, in this case, the victim of aggression, (b) making an authoritarian regime which possesses considerable capacities in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons feeling cornered, (c) increasing pressure on China to actively take sides while simultaneously (d) derailing economic recovery in the West. 

How do sanctions contribute to de-escalation and a peaceful outcome? We need to consider the big picture, at the same time as we maintain and strengthen support for Ukraine and a better future perspective for its citizens. First, the sanctions regime needs to include a way out for all parties involved and to refer directly to the Ukrainian war. This is not about regime change in Russia. It also not about making it impossible for China to play both sides. In fact, increasing pressure on Beijing to actively take sides may be unhelpful if de-escalation is the real priority.

Second, we also need to be reminded of a disturbing point we often avoid in public debate. Ground taken in combat cannot be easily returned in the context of a negotiated outcome as a precondition for the negotiation. A return to the status quo ante as a precondition for a negotiated settlement is unlikely.

Of course, 2022 cannot be allowed to become 2014. However, further cornering a dangerous autocrat who controls nuclear weapons is not the way forward – providing a smart way out for both parties is the real challenge. Serious work begins after the end of the war. We need to understand why deterrence failed (because it did), reflect on the medium-and longer-term horizon and ensure that this time we change course where change is needed. Even assuming the war ends shortly – hardly a plausible assumption – we will have to ask some difficult questions. Do all EU member states view their security now primarily within a transatlantic context? What will remain from the quest for “European Strategic Autonomy”? How does the EU component in the reinvigorated transatlantic context relate to actors like China? Depending on the future of extensive sanctions and the evolution of interactions with China, to what extend would further sanctions lead to a degree of de-globalization?

Summing up, we need to make sure that peace in a pluralistic world is restored and – at the same time – the Kremlin does not draw the conclusion that fait accompli is becoming acceptable as a norm of state conduct. Because the combination is difficult it does not follow we will abandon the effort. The US needs to reassure NATO allies while at the same time providing the framework and the limits of sanctions-related goals. Yet it is the Europeans that will have to draw the hardest conclusions on the need for actions that transcend the ephemeral world of political communication. We need to reach a negotiated peace with Russia, then urgently tackle energy dependency, strengthen cyber security, promote the EU as a strategic actor in the world, coordinate with Britain and reinvigorate the largely irreplaceable transatlantic bond.

We have lessons to learn from the tragedy in Ukraine. But we have also run out of cliches. So many aggressors around, so limited international response. Both parties in this devastating war should be actively encouraged to reach a fair and negotiated peace. Before escalation gets out of control.     

Kostas Ant. Lavdas, 22 March 2022

From unwinnable war to reflective peace: the role of sanctions in the Ukrainian tragedy

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia is a war. And it is a war of aggression. It began in the early morning hours local time on February 24, when Russian troops invaded Ukraine, shortly after Putin’s televised speech had announced a “special military operation” in Ukraine.

There has been a long and tortuous history of recriminations but when it comes to critical, hard facts another one stands out: the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. As in several other wars of aggression by other aggressors, historic or contemporary, the Kremlin claims its invasion was designed to “demilitarize” (and “denazify”) Kiev and stop the suppression of people of Russian origin in the Donbas. We have no independent corroboration that there had been a “systematic extermination” in the area.

At any rate, the Russian army is now working toward cutting off Ukraine not just from the Sea of Azof but from the Black Sea as well. A major change of borders is clearly among the Kremlin’s goals. And it was also clear from the start of the war that Putin’s goals included a change of government in Kiev – although this may or may not have been abandoned by now.  

A war of aggression requires a serious response by the international community. Severe international sanctions are needed to underline the severity of breach suffered by international norms of acceptable state conduct. Sanctions are an instrument, a means toward a set of goals. What are the goals exactly in this case? What is the time frame? And – crucially – what are the appropriate measures, alongside sanctions, to help make a negotiated peace more likely as an outcome?  

In the recent past, for example after Poroshenko’s election, the United States gave support to Ukraine in the form of technical assistance, loans, and non-lethal military aid. Given the enormous significance of what Putin has been doing in the past ten days, lethal military aid along a wide range of other forms of assistance are now necessary for the right message to reach the Kremlin.

After the Crimean annexation, the US had also started imposing escalated sanctions on selected Russian officials. At the same time, as Angela Stent has written, in the US as in Europe, the idea was to somehow reengage Russia and give it an “off-ramp” to defuse the situation.

Given the recklessness of Putin’s new adventure that began on February 24, many appear to assume that reengagement was a bad idea. In fact, it was not. What was deplorable was the absence of sustained effort to talk to Russia, understand some of its concerns but also make brutally clear the red lines the West wished imposed and respected.

Today people get killed, a massive exodus is under way from Ukraine, whole areas become deserted, and while all this takes place in front of our eyes, some pundits confuse sanctions with punishment.

In fact, first and foremost, sanctions are not supposed to complicate the end of conflict. Yet they can do just that by (a) offering an over-optimistic vision to the weaker part of the conflict which is also, in this case, the victim of aggression, (b) making an authoritarian regime which possesses considerable capacities in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons feeling cornered, (c) increasing pressure on China to actively take sides while simultaneously (d) derailing economic recovery in the West. 

How do sanctions contribute to de-escalation and a peaceful outcome? There are now – present time, particular context – two basic requirements in order for sanctions to contribute to a peaceful way out and lead to the right lessons for all parties involved, at the same time as we maintain and strengthen support, assistance and a better future perspective for Ukraine. First, the sanctions regime needs to include a way out for all parties involved and to refer directly and solely to the Ukrainian war. As veteran diplomat Gérard Araud put it, “no overkill, no [Russian] regime change, no other issues”.

Second, we also need to be reminded of a crucial point we tend to avoid in public debate for fear that we are mistaken to be lenient toward the aggressor. And the crucial point is simply this: no ground actually taken in combat can be easily returned in the context of a negotiated outcome as a precondition for the negotiation. Rarely in history have we seen examples of that. In other words, the actual options in this regard are two: either Ukraine prevails with the help but not the actual involvement of the West; or some of Russian’s gains will have to be – in some form – a part of the subject matter on the negotiating table. A return to the status quo ante as a precondition for a negotiated settlement is unlikely. No embellishment is helpful on this.

Understandably, some people may ask: does this amount to condoning Russian aggression? It clearly does not if we reflect on what went wrong, understand why deterrence failed (because it did), focus on the medium-and longer-term horizon and ensure that this time the focus is sustained and leads to a change of course. For example, Europe’s critical energy dependence on Russia must come to an end. More generally, the year 2022 cannot be allowed to become 2014 in terms of longer-term implications.

Putin is the aggressor in this horrible episode, reminding us how fragile peace still is in 21^st century Europe. But Zelensky is ill-advised to ask for active NATO involvement in a war that may spiral out of control. There are lessons to be drawn on Ukraine’s side as well, including partial responsibility for the non-implementation of the Minsk agreements. Both sides should aim to extend ceasefires (currently meant to open civilian evacuation corridors) to create time slots for formal or informal talks to begin in earnest.

To sum up, we need to make sure that peace in a pluralistic world is restored and – at the same time – the Kremlin does not draw the conclusion that fait accompli is becoming acceptable as a norm of state conduct. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have remarkable experience in foreign affairs. Most of their European counterparts do not. The US needs to reassure NATO allies – President Biden has been doing that convincingly – while at the same time providing the framework and the limits of sanctions-related goals. Yet it is the Europeans that will have to draw the hardest conclusions on the need for actions that transcend the ephemeral world of political communication. We need to reach a negotiated peace with Russia, then urgently tackle energy dependency, strengthen cyber security, promote the EU as a strategic actor in the world while also reinvigorating the largely irreplaceable transatlantic bond.

We have serious lessons to learn from the tragedy in Ukraine. But we have also run out of cliches. So many aggressors around in recent years, so limited international response. Both parties in this devastating war should be actively encouraged to reach a fair and negotiated peace.     

Kostas Ant. Lavdas

March 5, 2022

K.A. Lavdas, Great-power confederalism: European republicanism at a crossroads (2019)

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ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ / Δεύτερο Μέρος

Intro_polit_analysi_2nd_part

ΕΙΔΙΚΑ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΣΧΕΣΕΩΝ, I – II & III – IV

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About

I would describe myself as a committed but critical (and mildly disappointed) Europeanist – in the sense of being a specialist in European politics and history as well as an advocate for Europeanism.

Currently Professor of European Politics at Panteion University in Athens, Greece, previously taught as a Professor of European Politics and Director of the Centre for Political Research and Documentation (KEPET) at the University of Crete – Greece’s premier research university – where I also served as Vice-Rector for Academic Affairs and Personnel and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences.

I was born in Athens in 1964 and studied political science, political theory, public policy and international relations in Athens, the UK (at LSE and the University of Manchester) and the USA (at MIT). I have published extensively (in English, German, and Greek) on the EU, European politics, comparative Mediterranean politics and public policy, comparative interest group politics and applied political theory. I have taught (as a Professor, an Associate Professor and a Senior Lecturer) and researched (as a Senior Research Fellow and a Research Associate) at various universities and research centers in Europe and the USA, including The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts, Cambridge, Bristol, London School of Economics and the National School of Public Administration in Athens. I have served at various boards, including the board at Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM) and at the Center for Educational Research (KEE).

My books include:

– The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of Integration (London / New York: Macmillan / St Martin’s Press, 1997).

– Politics, Subsidies and Competition: The New Politics of State Intervention in the European Union (with M. Mendrinou) (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999).

– Interests and Politics: Interest Organization and Patterns of Governance (in Greek) (Athens: Papazisis, 2004)

– Politics between the Potential and the Familiar (in Greek) (Athens: Sideris, 2010).

– A Republic of Europeans: Civic Potential in a Liberal Milieu (with D. Chryssochoou) (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011).

– America: Political Development, Democracy and Extroversion in US Politics (in Greek] (Athens: Papazisis Publishers, 2012).

– Stateness and Sovereign Debt: Greece in the European Conundrum (K. A. Lavdas, S. N. Litsas & D. V. Skiadas) (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/ Rowman &, Littlefield, 2014; paperback 2015).

– Citizens’ Liberalism: An Evolutionary Quest with a Republican Compass (in Greek) (Athens: Papazisi Publishers, 2015).

– Formation and Development of the European Communities (in Greek) (Patras: Hellenic Open University, 2003).

Co-editor (with D. Chryssochoou) of European Unification and Political Theory: The Challenge of Republicanism (in Greek) (Athens: Sideris, 2004) and (with D. Chryssochoou and D. Xenakis) of Directions in the Study of International Relations (in Greek) (Athens: Sideris, 2010).

Author of numerous chapters in international volumes (The Political Economy of Privatization; Verbände und Interessengruppen in den Ländern der Europäischen Union; Verbände und Verbandssysteme in Westeuropa; Republicanism in Theory and Practice; Citizenship and Multiculturalism in Western Liberal Democracies; The New Balkans; among others) and articles in international journals (including European Journal of Political Research; West European Politics; Journal of Political and Military Sociology; Politics; Journal of Power, Politics and Governance; Review of History and Political Science; among others).

Being a referee for international journals (including Political Studies, European Journal of Political Theory, Journal of European Public Policy, Government and Opposition, Ethnic and Racial Studies, among others) and research funding institutions (including the ESRC of the UK) has been an honor and a challenge. Country Expert (Greece) in Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) International Project. Among other research projects, I was the coordinator, Greek team, of the EU-funded European Joint Master’s Programme on Governance for Sustainable Development (GAVA) (BRD, FR, GR, PL, UK).

In 2007-2009 I occupied the Constantine Karamanlis Chair of Hellenic and European Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts, USA, and in 2009 I was a Senior Research Fellow at the European Institute, The London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. In 2014-2016 I served as the first returning Constantine Karamanlis Professor at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the US.

My current research is motivated by two distinct but ultimately mutually reinforcing concerns: the implications of EU and Eurozone membership for state structures and governance-interest interactions in Southern Europe; and the potential of a civic version of liberalism for reinvigorating patterns of responsible and accountable participation in Greece’s political culture.

 

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